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1Wireless Powered Cooperative Jamming for
Secrecy Multi-AF Relaying Networks
Hong Xing, Kai-Kit Wong, Arumugam Nallanathan, and Rui Zhang
Abstract
This paper studies secrecy transmission with the aid of a group of wireless energy harvesting
(WEH)-enabled amplify-and-forward (AF) relays performing cooperative jamming (CJ) and relaying.
The source node in the network does simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT)
with each relay employing a power splitting (PS) receiver in the first phase; each relay further divides
its harvested power for forwarding the received signal and generating artificial noise (AN) for jamming
the eavesdroppers in the second transmission phase. In the centralized case with global channel state
information (CSI), we provide closed-form expressions for the optimal and/or suboptimal AF-relay
beamforming vectors to maximize the achievable secrecy rate subject to individual power constraints
of the relays, using the technique of semidefinite relaxation (SDR), which is proved to be tight. A
fully distributed algorithm utilizing only local CSI at each relay is also proposed as a performance
benchmark. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed multi-AF relaying with CJ
over other suboptimal designs.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless powered communication network has arisen as a new system with stable and self-
sustainable power supplies in shaping future-generation wireless communications [1, 2]. The
enabling technology, known as simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT),
has particularly drawn an upsurge of interests owing to the far-field electromagnetic power
carried by radio-frequency (RF) signals that affluently exist in wireless communications. With the
transmit power, waveforms, and dimensions of resources, etc., being all fully controllable, SWIPT
promises to prolong the lifetime of wireless devices while delivering the essential communication
functionality, as will be important for low-power applications such as wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) (see [3, 4] and the references therein).
On the other hand, privacy and authentication have increasingly become major concerns for
wireless communications and physical (PHY)-layer security has emerged as a new layer of
defence to realize perfect secrecy transmission in addition to the costly upper-layer techniques.
In this regard, relay-assisted secure transmission was proposed [5, 6] and PHY-layer security
enhancements by means of cooperative communications have since attracted much attention
[7–20].
In particular, cooperative schemes can be mainly classified into three categories: decode-
and-forward (DF), amplify-and-forward (AF), and cooperative jamming (CJ) [7] with CJ being
the most relevant to PHY-layer security. Specifically, coordinated CJ refers to the scheme of
generating a common jamming signal across all relay helpers against eavesdropping [7, 10, 12,
13], while uncoordinated CJ considers that each relay helper emits independent artificial noise
(AN) to confound the eavesdroppers [15, 16]. In addition, when the direct link is broken between
the transmitter (Tx) and the legitimate receiver (Rx), some of the relays have to be chosen to
forward the information while others will perform CJ [17, 18]. A recent paradigm that generalizes
all the aforementioned cooperation strategies is cooperative beamforming (CB) mixed with CJ
[19, 20], where the available power at each relay is split into two parts: one for forwarding the
confidential message and the other for CJ.
However, mixed CB-CJ approaches may be prohibitive in applications with low power devices
because idle relays with limited battery supplies would likely prefer saving power for their
own traffic to assisting others’ communication. In light of this, SWIPT provides the incentive
3for potential helpers to perform dedicated CB mixed with CJ at no expense of its own power.
Motivated by this, our work considers secrecy transmission from a Tx to a legitimate Rx with the
aid of a set of single-antenna wireless energy harvesting (WEH)-enabled AF-operated relays in
the presence of multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. As a matter of fact, cooperative schemes
that involve WEH-enabled relays operating with dynamic power splitting (DPS) Rx architecture
[21] were early investigated in [22, 23] without (w/o) security consideration. [26, 27] and [28]
advocated the dual use of AN signal for concurrently confusing the eavesdropper(s) and satisfying
the energy harvesting (EH) requirements of Rx(s) in the SWIPT multiple-input single-output
(MISO) and fading wiretap channels, respectively, while our work differs from them in the
sense that our WEH-enabled Rxs will continue with performing CB mixed with CJ for (secrecy)
transmission in the second transmit-slot after harvesting power as well as receiving information in
the first transmit-slot of AF relaying. [29], in spite of considering secure cooperative beamforming
in a SWIPT-enabled AF relay network, employed conventional self-powered relay in the first
transmit-slot and separate energy and information Rxs in the second transmit-slot, which also
differs from ours.
In particular, motivated by the strong interest in SWIPT and the vast degree-of-freedom (DoF)
achievable by cooperative relays, this paper aims to maximize the secrecy rate with the aid of
WEH-enabled AF-operated relays, subject to the EH power constraints of individual relays. The
scenario is applicable to WSNs, e.g., a remote health system where a moving patient reports
its physical data to a health centre with the aid of intermediary sensor nodes installed on other
patients in the vicinity. In this paper, we assume that there is no direct link between the source
and destination nodes, and perfect global channel state information (CSI) is available for the
case of centralized optimization.
It is worth pointing out that our work also differs from [25] where an efficient algorithm was
proposed to maximize the secrecy rate by optimizing the PS ratios and AF relay beamforming.
The difference is two-fold. First, AN was not considered in the second transmission phase in
[25]. Second, they proposed an algorithm that is shown to converge to only a local optimum,
as opposed to our work that gives the global optimal solutions for “CB mixed with CJ” with
relays operating with static power splitting (SPS), and “purely CB” with relays operating with
DPS, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes two types of WEH-enabled
4Rx architecture for the AF relays and defines the secrecy rate of the relay wiretap channel.
Section III then formulates the secrecy rate maximization problems that jointly optimize the
AN (or CJ) and the AF-relay CB for the WEH-enabled relays operating with the two types of
Rx. The problems are respectively solved by centralized schemes in Section IV and distributed
approaches in Section V. Section VI provides simulation results to evaluate the performance of
the proposed schemes. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
Notations—We use the uppercase boldface letters for matrices and lowercase boldface letters
for vectors. The superscripts (·)T , (·)†, (·)H and (·)∗ represent, respectively, the transpose,
conjugate, conjugate transpose operations on vectors or matrices, and the optimum. In addition,
trace(·) stands for the trace of a square matrix. Moreover, [·]i,j denotes the (i, j)th entry of
a matrix, while ‖ · ‖ and ‖ · ‖.2 represent the Euclidean norm and the entry-wise absolute
value square of a vector, respectively. Also, diag(·) denotes a diagonal matrix with its diagonal
specified by the given vector and [·]Ni=1 represents an N×1 vector with each element indexed by
i. Furthermore, · and ◦ stand for product and Hadamard product, respectively. C(R)x×y denotes
the field of complex (real) matrices with dimension x × y and E[·] indicates the expectation
operation. Finally, (x)+ is short for max(0, x).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1. The system model for an AF relay-assisted SWIPT WSN.
In this paper, we consider secrecy transmission in a SWIPT-enabled WSN as shown in Fig. 1,
where a Tx (Alice) wants to establish confidential communication with the legitimate Rx (Bob)
with the aid of N WEH-enabled sensors operating as AF relays1, denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , N},
1“N” only refers to the number of active sensors that are within direct connection to the Tx.
5in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers (Eves), denoted by K = {1, 2, . . . , K}, all equipped
with single antenna. Note that we only consider the case of no direct Tx-Eves links herein for
the simplicity of exposition, since eavesdroppers are assumed to be distributed outside from a
“security zone” [38] centered at the Tx, within which, eavesdroppers are otherwise detectable
by the Tx [39].2 We also assume that there is no direct link from the source to the destination
due to, for instance, severe path loss.
We consider a two-hop relaying protocol based on two equal time slots and the duration
of one transmit-slot is normalized to be one unit so that the terms “energy” and “power” are
interchangeable with respect to (w.r.t.) one transmit-slot.
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(a) SPS relay with fixed α¯i’s.
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(b) DPS relay with dynamic αi’s.
Fig. 2. Architectures of the receiver for WEH-enabled relay.
At the receiver of each AF relay, we introduce two types of WEH-enabled receiver architecture,
namely, static power splitting (SPS) (Fig. 2(a)) and DPS (Fig. 2(b)), both of which allow the
relay to harvest energy and receive information from the same received signal. Specifically,
the receiver first splits a portion of αi, of the received power for EH and the rest 1 − αi for
information receiving (IR), ∀i ∈ N . The αi portion of harvested power is further divided into
two streams with a fraction ρi of the power used for generating the AN versus the rest 1 − ρi
used for amplifying the received signal, where yri is the ith element of the received signal
yr ∈ CN×1, and 0 ≤ η < 1 denotes the EH efficiency. Note that DPS with adjustable αi’s is
presently the most general receiver operation because practical circuits cannot directly process
the information from the stream used for EH [21]. Furthermore, SPS is just a special case of DPS
with αi = α¯i fixed for the whole transmission duration. However, SPS, advocated for its ease
of implementation, is introduced separately in the sequel for its simplified relay beamforming
2Note that even if there exist direct links, our problem formulation and solutions are still applicable without much difficulties
in modification by incorporating destination-aided AN in the first transmit-slot (see [25]).
6design.
In the first transmit-slot, the received signal at each individual relay can be expressed as
yri = hsri
√
Pss + na,i, ∀i, (1)
where the transmit signal s is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variable
with zero mean and unit variance, denoted by s ∼ CN (0, 1), hsri denotes the complex channel
from the Tx to the ith relay, Ps is the transmit power at the Tx, and na,i is the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) introduced by the receiving antenna of the ith relay, denoted by na,i ∼
CN (0, σ2na). As such, the linearly amplified baseband equivalent signal at the output of the ith
relay is given by
xri1 = βi(
√
1− αiyri + nc,i), ∀i, (2)
where βi denotes the complex AF coefficient, and nc,i denotes the noise due to signal conversion
from the RF band to baseband, denoted by nc,i ∼ CN (0, σ2nc). Since xri1 is constrained by the
portion of the harvested power for forwarding, i.e., η(1−ρi)αi|yri|23, βi is accordingly given by
βi =
√
η(1− ρi)αi|hsri|2Ps
(1− αi)|hsri|2Ps + (1− αi)σ2na + σ2nc
ej∡βi, (3)
where ∡βi denotes the phase of the AF coefficient for the ith relay.
Next, we introduce the CJ scheme. Denote the CJ signal generated from N relays by xr2 =
[xr12, . . . , xrN2]
T and define its covariance matrix as S = E[xr2x
H
r2]. Then the coordinated CJ
transmission can be uniquely determined by the truncated eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of S
given by S = V˜ Σ˜V˜
H
, where Σ˜ = diag([σ1, . . . , σd]) is a diagonal matrix with σj , j = 1, . . . , d,
denoting all the positive eigenvalues of S and V˜ ∈ CN×d is the precoding matrix satisfying
V˜
H
V˜ = I . Note that d ≤ N denotes the rank of S which will be designed later. As a result,
the CJ signal can be expressed as
xr2 =
d∑
j=1
√
σjvjs
′
j , (4)
where vj’s are drawn from the columns of V , and s
′
j’s are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) complex Gaussian variables denoted by s′j ∼ CN (0, 1). On the other hand, |xri2|2 ≤
3Note that the harvested power from the receiving antenna noise is considerably little compared with that transferred by the
information signal, and therefore is safely removed in the sequel [4, 21].
7ηρiαi|yri|2, ∀i, denotes the power constraint for jamming at the ith relay, which implies that
trace(SEi) ≤ ηρiαiPs|hsri|2, ∀i, (5)
where Ei is a diagonal matrix with its diagonal ei (a unit vector with the ith entry equal to 1
and the rest equal to 0).
Note that the CJ scheme proposed above is of the most general form. For the special case
when d = 1, i.e., xr2 =
√
σ1v1s
′
1, each relay transmits a common jamming signal s
′
1 with their
respective weight drawn from v1 [7, 13]. This case is desirable in practice since it has the lowest
complexity for implementation. In summary, the transmitted signal at the ith relay is given by
xri = xri1 + xri2, ∀i. (6)
According to (6) together with (1), (2), and (4), the transmit signal from all relays can be
expressed in vector form as
xr = Dβαhsr
√
Pss +Dβαna +Dβnc +
d∑
j=1
√
σjvjs
′
j , (7)
where Dβα and Dβ are, respectively, diagonal matrices with their diagonals composed of
(β1
√
1− α1, . . . , βN
√
1− αN)T and (β1, . . . , βN)T . In addition, hsr = [hsri]Ni=1, na = [na,i]Ni=1,
and nc = [nc,i]
N
i=1.
In the second transmit-slot, the received signal at the desired receiver, i.e., Bob, is given by
yd = h
T
rdxr + nd, (8)
where hrd = [hrid]
N
i=1 comprises complex channels from the ith relay to the Rx and nd ∼
CN (0, σ2nd) is the corresponding receiving AWGN. By substituting (7) into (8), yd can be
expressed as
yd = h
T
rdDβαhsr
√
Pss+ h
T
rdDβαna + h
T
rdDβnc + h
T
rd
d∑
j=1
√
σjvjs
′
j + nd. (9)
The received signal at the kth Eve, ∀k ∈ K, is given by
ye,k = h
T
re,kDβαhsr
√
Pss+ h
T
re,kDβαna + h
T
re,kDβnc + h
T
re,k
d∑
j=1
√
σjvjs
′
j + ne,k, (10)
where hre,k = [hrie,k]
N
i=1 denotes the complex channels from the relays to the kth Eve and
ne,k ∼ CN (0, σ2ne,k) is the AWGN at the kth eavesdropper.
8SINRS,D =
Ps|hTrdDβαhsr |2
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd) + σ
2
na
‖hTrdDβα‖2 + σ2nc‖hTrdDβ‖2 + σ2nd
(12)
SINRS,E,k =
Ps|hTre,kDβαhsr|2
trace(Sh†re,kh
T
re,k) + σ
2
na
‖hTre,kDβα‖2 + σ2nc‖hTre,kDβ‖2 + σ2ne,k
(13)
The mutual information for the Rx (Bob) is given by rS,D =
1
2
log2(1 + SINRS,D), and that
for the kth Eve is rS,E,k =
1
2
log2(1 + SINRS,E,k), ∀k, where SINRS,D (c.f. (12)) and SINRS,E,k
(c.f. (13)) denote their respective signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs).
Next, we define the secrecy rate as follows [7, 30].
rsec =
(
rS,D −max
k∈K
rS,E,k
)+
(11)
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. AN-Aided Secrecy Relay Beamforming for SPS
In this section, we consider the secrecy rate maximization problem by jointly optimizing the
AN beams, relay beam and their power allocations for WEH-enabled AF relays operating with
SPS, i.e., αi = α¯i, ∀i, is fixed. For the purpose of simplifying SINR expressions in (12) and (13),
and facilitating the analysis in the sequel, we embark on a series of basic variable transformation
to yield
rS,D =
1
2
log2
(
1 + Ps|h˜
T
sdw1|
2
trace(Sh†
rd
h
T
rd)+w
H
1 Dsˆd
w1+σ2nd
)
, (14)
where w1,i =
√
1− ρiej∡βi ,
[h˜sd]i , hsrihrid
√
ηα¯i(1−α¯i)|hsri |
2Ps
(1−α¯i)(|hsri |
2Ps+σ2na )+σ
2
nc
, (15)
and
[Dsˆd]i,i =
ηα¯iPs|hsri|2|hrid|2((1− α¯i)σ2na + σ2nc)
(1− α¯i)(|hsri|2Ps + σ2na) + σ2nc
, (16)
∀i ∈ N . Similarly by letting
[h˜se,k]i , hsrihrie,k
√
ηα¯i(1− α¯i)|hsri|2Ps
(1− α¯i)(|hsri|2Ps + σ2na) + σ2nc
(17)
9SINRS,D =
Ps|sTsdu1|2
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd) + σ
2
na
uH
1
diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2)u1 + σ2ncuH2 diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2)u2 + σ2nd
(21)
SINRS,E,k =
Ps|sTse,ku1|2
trace(Sh†re,kh
T
re,k) + σ
2
na
uH
1
diag(c0 ◦ ‖hre,k‖.2)u1 + σ2ncuH2 diag(c0 ◦ ‖hre,k‖.2)u2 + σ2ne,k
(22)
and
[Dsˆe,k]i,i ,
ηα¯iPs|hsri|2|hrie,k|2((1− α¯i)σ2na + σ2nc)
(1− α¯i)(|hsri|2Ps + σ2na) + σ2nc
, (18)
we have
rS,E,k =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
Ps|h˜
T
se,kw1|
2
trace(Sh†
re,k
h
T
re,k)+w
H
1 Dsˆe,kw1+σ
2
ne,k
)
. (19)
(5) can thus be reformulated as a per-relay jamming power constraint given by
trace(SEi) ≤ ηα¯iPs|hsri|2(1− |w1,i|2), ∀i. (20)
Now, the secrecy rate maximization problem w.r.t. ρi’s, ∡βi’s and S for SPS-based relays can
be formulated as
(P1) : max
w1,S
(
rS,D −max
k∈K
rS,E,k
)+
s.t. (20), S  0.
B. AN-Aided Secrecy Relay Beamforming for DPS
Here, we consider the secrecy rate maximization problem for WEH-enabled AF relays with
adjustable PS ratios {αi} by jointly optimizing the AN beams, relay beam, WEH PS ratios
{αi}, and AN PS ratios {ρi}. In order to expose (12) and (13) in tractable forms for the joint
optimization, consider the following variable transformation:

u1,i =
√
αi(1−αi)(1−ρi)
(1−αi)(|hsri |
2Ps+σ2na )+σ
2
nc
ej∡βi
u2,i =
√
αi(1−ρi)
(1−αi)(|hsri |
2Ps+σ2na )+σ
2
nc
, ∀i. (23)
Using this, SINRS,D and SINRS,E,k, ∀k, can be alternatively expressed as (21) and (22), where
ssd = [hsrihrid
√
η|hsri|2Ps]Ni=1, sse,k = [hsrihrie,k
√
η|hsri|2Ps]Ni=1, ∀k, and c0,i = ηPs|hsri|2, ∀i.
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Then, we recast the constraints w.r.t. S, αi’s, and ρi’s to those w.r.t. the transformed variables
u1,i’s and u2,i’s as follows.
 αi = 1−
|u1,i|2
|u2,i|2
ρi = 1− |u2,i|
2(c1,i|u1,i|
2+σ2nc |u2,i|
2)
|u2,i|2−|u1,i|2
, ∀i, (24)
where c1,i = Ps|hsri|2 + σ2na . Replacing αi’s and ρi’s with (24), (5) is reformulated as
trace(SEi) ≤ c0,i
(
1− |u2,i|
2(c1,i|u1,i|2 + σ2nc |u2,i|2)
|u2,i|2 − |u1,i|2
)(
1− |u1,i|
2
|u2,i|2
)
, ∀i. (25)
On the other hand, since αi ≥ 0 and ρi ≥ 0, ∀i, it follows from (24) that
|u1,i|2 − |u2,i|2 ≤ 0, ∀i, (26)
|u2,i|2(c1,i|u1,i|2 + σ2nc|u2,i|2) ≤ |u2,i|2 − |u1,i|2, ∀i. (27)
As such, the secrecy rate maximization problem for DPS-based relays becomes
(P2) : max
u1,u2,S
(
1
2
log2(1 + (21))−
1
2
log2(1 + max
k∈K
(22))
)+
s.t. (25), (26), (27), andS  0.
IV. CENTRALIZED SECURE AF RELAYING
In this section, we resort to centralized approaches to solve problem (P1) and (P2), respec-
tively, assuming that there is a central optimizer that is able to collect global CSI, perform
the optimization and necessary secrecy code designs, and broadcast to relays their individual
optimized parameters.
A. Optimal Solutions for SPS
To start with, we recast (P1) into a two-stage problem by introducing a slack variable τ . First
of all, we solve the epigraph reformulation of (P1) with a fixed τ ∈ (0, 1] as
(P1.1) : max
w1,S0
Ps|h˜Tsdw1|2
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd) +w
H
1 Dsˆdw1 + σ
2
nd
s.t. (20) and
1 +
Ps|h˜Tse,kw1|2
trace(Sh†re,kh
T
re,k) +w
H
1 D ˆse,kw1 + σ
2
ne,k
≤ 1/τ, ∀k.
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Defining f1(τ) as the optimum value of (P1.1) and denoting H1(τ) = τf1(τ), the objective
function of (P1) is given by
1
2
log2(1 + f1(τ))−
1
2
log2(1/τ) =
1
2
log2(τ +H1(τ)), (28)
where (·)+ in the objective function has been omitted and we claim a zero secrecy rate if (28)
admits a negative value. As a result, (P1) can be equivalently given by
(P1.2) : max
τmin,1≤τ≤1
log2(τ +H1(τ)).
Note that this single-variable optimization problem allows for simple one-dimension search over
τ ∈ [τmin,1, 1], assuming thatH1(τ) is attainable. As the physical meaning of 1/τ−1 in (P1.1) can
be interpreted as the maximum permitted SINR for the best eavesdropper’s channel, feasibility
for a non-zero secrecy rate implies that
τ
(a)
≥ 1
1 + Ps‖h˜sd‖2‖w1‖2/σ2nd
(b)
≥ 1
1 +NPs‖h˜sd‖2/σ2nd
= τmin,1, (29)
where Cauchy-Schwarz inequality has been applied in (a), and (b) follows from |w1,i|2 ≤ 1,
∀i ∈ N .
The above epigraph reformulation of non-convex problems like (P1) has been widely em-
ployed in the literature [20, 35], and (P1.2) admits the same optimal value as (P1) while (P1.1)
with the optimal τ provides the corresponding optimal solution to (P1). We summarize the steps
for solving (P1) here: given any τ ∈ [τmin,1, 1], solve (P1.1) to obtain H1(τ); solve (P1.2) via
a one-dimensional search over τ . Before developing solutions to (P1.1), we have the lemma
below.
Lemma 4.1: H1(τ) is a concave function of τ .
Proof: We only outline the sketch of the proof herein due to the space limitation. The
interested reader can refer to a longer version of this paper [31, Appendix A]. First, we formulate
the dual problem of (P1.1-SDP), and then we investigate the property of H1(τ) by looking into
the objective function of the dual problem through strong duality.
Remark 4.1: Using Lemma 4.1, it is easy to verify that 1
2
log2(τ +H1(τ)) is also a concave
function of τ according to the composition rule [32, pp. 84], which allows for a more effective
search for the optimum τ , e.g., bi-section method, than the exhaustive search used in [26].
Moreover, although H1(τ) is not differentiable w.r.t. τ , the bi-section method can still be
implemented, and the involved algorithm will be given later in Section IV-B.
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In the sequel, we focus on solving (P1.1). By introducing X1 = w1w
H
1 and ignoring the
rank-one constraint on X1, (P1.1) can be alternatively solved by
(P1.1-SDR) :

max
X1,S0
τPstrace(X1h˜
†
sdh˜
T
sd)
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd) + trace(X1Dsˆd) + σ
2
nd
s.t.
Pstrace(X1h˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k)
trace(Sh†re,kh
T
re,k) + trace(X1Dsˆe,k) + σ
2
ne,k
≤ 1
τ
− 1, ∀k,
trace((S + ηα¯iPs|hsri|2X1)Ei) ≤ ηα¯iPs|hsri|2, ∀i.
Note that the objective function has been multiplied by τ compared with that of (P1.1) for ready
computation of H1(τ).
Although (P1.1-SDR) is made easier to solve than (P1.1) by rank relaxation, it is still
a quasi-convex problem considering the linear fractional form of the objective function and
constraints [40], for which Charnes-Cooper transformation [33] will be applied for equivalent
convex reformulation. Specifically, by substituting X1 = Xˆ1/ξ and S = Sˆ/ξ into (P1.1-SDR),
it follows that
(P1.1-SDP) :

max
Xˆ1,Sˆ0,ξ≥0
Pstrace(Xˆ1h˜
†
sdh˜
T
sd)
s.t. trace(Sˆh†rdh
T
rd) + trace(Xˆ1Dsˆd) + ξσ
2
nd
= τ,(
1
τ
− 1
)(
trace(Sˆh†re,kh
T
re,k) + trace(Xˆ1Dsˆe,k) + ξσ
2
ne,k
)
≥ Pstrace(Xˆ1h˜†se,kh˜
T
se,k), ∀k,
trace((Sˆ + ηα¯iPs|hsri|2Xˆ1)Ei) ≤ ξηα¯iPs|hsri|2, ∀i.
Problem (P1.1-SDP) can now be optimally and efficiently solved using interior-point based
methods by some off-the-shelf convex optimization toolboxes, e.g., CVX [34].
Proposition 4.1: We have the following results:
1) The optimal solution to (P1.1-SDP) satisfies rank(Xˆ
∗
1) = 1;
2) Xˆ
∗
1 = wˆ
∗
1wˆ
∗H
1 , where wˆ
∗
1 is given by
wˆ∗1 =
√√√√τ − ξ∗σ2nd − trace(Sˆ∗h†rdhTrd)
trace(wˆ1wˆ
H
1 Dsˆd)
wˆ1, (30)
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τPstrace(U1s
†
sds
T
sd)
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd) + trace((σ
2
na
U1 + σ2ncU2)diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2)) + σ2nd
(31)
1 +
Pstrace(U 1s
†
se,ks
T
se,k)
trace(Sh†re,kh
T
re,k) + trace((σ
2
na
U1 + σ2ncU2)diag(c0 ◦ ‖hre,k‖.2)) + σ2ne,k
≤ 1
τ
(32)
in which wˆ1 is given in Appendix A;
3) rank(Sˆ
∗
) ≤ min(K,N).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Proposition 4.1 implies that the rank-one relaxation of (P1.1-SDR) from (P1.1) is tight for
an arbitrary given τ . The ρ∗’s and ∡β∗i ’s can thus be retrieved from the magnitude and angle of
w∗1, respectively, by applying EVD to X
∗
1.
B. Proposed Solutions for DPS
Similar to Section IV-A, in this section, we aim at solving the two-stage reformulation of
(P2) by introducing a slack variable τ ∈ [τmin,2, 1]. First, for a given τ , we solve
(P2.1) : max
u1,u2,S
(21) s.t. (22) ≤ 1
τ
, ∀k, (25)− (27).
Next, denoting τf2(τ) by H2(τ) (c.f. (31)), where f2(τ) is the optimum value for problem
(P2.1), we solve the following problem that attains the same optimum value as (P2):
(P2.2) : max
τ
log2(τ +H2(τ)) s.t. τmin,2 ≤ τ ≤ 1,
where τmin,2 is similarly derived as τmin,1 so that we directly arrive at
τ ≥ 1
1 + Ps‖ssd‖2
∑N
i=1
1
σ2nd
(|hsri |
2Ps+σ2na+σ
2
nc
)
, (33)
which is denoted by τmin,2. We claim that (P2.2) can be solved by bi-section for τ over the
interval [τmin,2, 1] assuming that H2(τ) is valid for any given τ (Otherwise a zero secrecy rate,
i.e., H2(τ) = 0, is returned.), since H2(τ) has the following property.
Lemma 4.2: H2(τ) is a concave function of τ .
Proof: The proof is similar to that for Lemma 4.1, and thus is omitted.
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It is also seen that how to attain H2(τ) forms the main thrust for solving (P2). However,
the constraints in (25), (26) and (27) are not convex w.r.t. u1,i and/or u2,i, ∀i, due to their high
orders and multiplicative structure. (P2.1) thus turns out to be very hard to solve in general. To
cope with these non-convex constraints, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 ([24]): The restricted hyperbolic constraints which have the form xHx ≤ yz,
where x ∈ CN×1, y, z ≥ 0, are equivalent to rotated second-order cone (SOC) constraints as
follows. ∥∥∥∥∥∥

 2x
y − z


∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ y + z. (34)
For convenience, denoting |u1,i|2, |u2,i|2, trace(SEi) by xi, yi, and zi, respectively , ∀i, (25)
can be rewritten as
zi ≤ c0,i
(
1− yi(c1,ixi + σ
2
nc
yi)
yi − xi
)(
1− xi
yi
)
⇔ zi
c0,i
≤ 1− xi
yi
− (c1,ixi + σ2ncyi)
⇔ (σncyi)2 +
(√(
1− zi
c0,i
)
1
c1,i
)2
≤
(
1− zi
c0,i
− c1,sr,ixi
)(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
. (35)
According to (5) and (23), it is easily verified that 1− zi
c0,sr,i
−c1,sr,ixi > 1−ρiαi−(1−ρi)αi ≥ 0.
Hence, (35) is eligible for Lemma 4.3, which is reformulated into the SOC constraint:∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2σncyi
2
√(
1− zi
c0,i
)
1
c1,i(
1− zi
c0,i
− c1,ixi
)
−
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
(
1− zi
c0,i
− c1,ixi
)
+
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
. (36)
Similarly, (27) can be simplified as yi(c1,ixi + σ
2
nc
yi) ≤ yi − xi, and after some manipulation,
it is recast into a constraint of the restricted hyperbolic form as
(σncyi)
2 +
(√
1
c1,i
)2
≤ (1− c1,ixi)
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
. (37)
(37) is thus, in line with Lemma 4.3, equivalent to an SOC constraint given by∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2σncyi
2
√
1
c1,i
(1− c1,ixi)−
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ (1− c1,ixi) +
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
. (38)
At last, (26) is a linear constraint w.r.t. xi and yi given by
xi − yi ≤ 0, ∀i. (39)
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Note that (25)–(27) have so far been equivalently transformed into the SOC constraints (36),
the linear constraints (39), as well as (38), the latter two of which are jointly convex w.r.t. xi
and yi, ∀i. However, (36) is still not convex w.r.t. zi, ∀i, yet. To circumvent this, in the sequel
we propose to solve problem (P2) by alternating optimization. The upshot of the algorithm is
that first we fix S by S and thus zi by z¯i = trace(SEi), ∀i, and solve problem (P2′)4 to find
the optimal {α∗}, {ρ∗} and {∡βi} via (P2′.1) and (P2′.2); then with α¯i = α∗i , ∀i, we devise
the optimal solution derived in Section IV-A to obtain the optimal CJ covariance, viz, S∗, and
thus z∗i = trace(S
∗Ei), ∀i; finally, by updating S = S∗ and z¯i = z∗i , ∀i, problems (P2′) and
(P1) are iteratively solved until they converge.
The remaining challenges lie in solving problem (P2′.1) now that (36), (38) and (39) are all
made convex w.r.t. their variables xi, yi, ∀i. Similar to that for (P1.1), we introduce U 1 = u1uH1
and U 2 = u2u
H
2 and exempt problem (P2
′.1) from rank(U 1) = 1 and rank(U 2) = 1 as follows:
(P2′.1-SDR) :

max
U1,U20,{xi},{yi}
H2(τ)
s.t. (32), ∀k, (36), (38), (39),
trace(U 1Ei) = xi, trace(U 2Ei) = yi, ∀i.
Recalling the procedure to deal with (P1.1-SDR), we now apply Charnes-Cooper transformation
to convert (P2′.1-SDR) into a convex problem, denoted by (P2′.1-SDP), by replacing U 1 and
U 2 with Uˆ 1/ξ and Uˆ 2/ξ, respectively. The solution for (P2
′.1-SDP) is tight and characterized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2: We have the following results:
1) The optimal solution to (P2′.1-SDP) satisfies rank(Uˆ
∗
1) = 1 such that Uˆ
∗
1 = uˆ
∗
1uˆ
∗H
1 ;
2) uˆ∗1 is given by
uˆ∗1 =
√√√√τ − ξ∗σ2nd − σ2nctrace(Uˆ ∗2Crd)− ξ∗trace(Sh†rdhTrd)
σ2natrace(uˆ1uˆ
H
1 Crd)
uˆ1, (40)
where uˆ1 = (Ξ
′ +
∑K
k=1 θ
∗
kPss
†
se,ks
T
se,k)
−1s
†
sd, Crd = diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2);
4Note that we denote problem (P2) ((P2.1), (P2.2)) with fixed S as (P2′) ((P2′.1),(P2′.2)) in the sequel.
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3) Uˆ
∗
2, of which the diagonal entries compose a vector denoted by uˆ
∗
2, can be reconstructed by
uˆ∗2.
1
2 uˆ∗H2 .
1
2 , where ·. 12 denotes the element-wise square root.
Proof: We only outline the sketch of the proof herein due to the space limitation. The
interested reader can refer to a longer version of this paper [31, Appendix C]. First, we show
that problem (P2′.1-SDR) is equivalent to another problem without equality constraints; next,
we devise the Charnes-Cooper transformation to the equivalent problem and derive its partial
Lagrangian in terms of the optimization variables requiring proof of rank one; then, in accordance
with the resultant KKT conditions, the rank property of Uˆ
∗
1 is investigated by discussing the
positive definiteness of a constructive matrix as similar to Appendix A.
Remark 4.2: The proof for both Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 relies on an important argument that
the dual variables associated with Xˆ1 and Uˆ 1 are both shown to take on a special structure,
that is, a full-rank matrix minus a rank-one matrix. Note that this observation plays a key role
in proving the rank-one property of Xˆ
∗
1 and Uˆ
∗
1, which is also identified in [20, Appendix C].
The α∗i ’s and ρi’s are thus attained according to (24) via EVD of U
∗
1 and U
∗
2. The proposed
algorithm for solving (P2) is presented in Table I.
V. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHMS
In this section, we investigate heuristic algorithms to solve problems (P1) and (P2) in a
completely distributed fashion. Note that different from the paradigm of distributed optimization
that allows for certain amount of information exchange based on which iterative algorithms are
developed to gradually improve the system performance, we herein assume that each individual
relay can only make decision based on its local CSIs, namely, hsri , hrid, hrie, ∀i, and there is
no extra means of information acquisition for ease of implementation. The purpose for such an
algorithm is twofold: on one hand, we aim to answer the question that in the least favourable
situation, namely, no coordination over the relays, how to improve the achievable secrecy rate of
the system? On the other hand, it provides a lower-bound for the centralized schemes proposed
in Section IV, which sheds light upon the trade-off achievable between secrecy performance and
complexity.
Besides, we emphasize the jamming scheme that is different from the CJ in the centralized
schemes. Unlike the CJ signal coordinately transmitted by all relays, in the distributed imple-
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TABLE I
Algorithm for Solving (P2)
Require: S∗; r∗SPS that denotes the optimum value for (P1) given α¯i = .5, ∀i
1: ii← 0, r
(ii)
sec ← r
∗
SPS
2: repeat
3: ii← ii+ 1
4: S¯ ← S∗ , z¯i ← trace(S
∗
Ei), ∀i, and solve (P2
′):
5: kk ← 0, r
(0)
DPS ← 10
−6, r
(1)
DPS ← 10, l ← τmin,2, u← 1
6: while |r
(kk+1)
DPS − r
(kk)
DPS|/r
(kk)
DPS > ǫb do
7: kk ← kk + 1, τ ← l+u
2
8: solve (P2′.1) and
9: return H2(τ )
10: r
(kk+1)
DPS ←
1
2
log2(τ +H2(τ ))
11: rtemp ←
1
2
log2(τ˜ +H2(τ˜)), where τ˜ ← max(τ −∆τ, τmin,1) and ∆τ > 0 denotes an arbitrary small value.
12: if r
(kk+1)
DPS ≤ rtemp then
13: u← τ
14: else
15: l← τ
16: end if
17: end while
18: return U∗1, U
∗
2 , and obtain {α
∗
i } according to (24)
19: α¯i ← α
∗
i , ∀i, and solve (P1) via (P1.1) and (P1.2)
20: return X∗1, S
∗, and obtain {ρ∗i } and {∡β
∗
i } according to w
∗
1,i =
√
1− ρ∗i e
j∡β∗i , ∀i
21: Update r
(ii)
sec according to (11)
22: until r
(ii)
sec − r
(ii−1)
sec ≤ ǫ0
Ensure: {α∗i }, {ρ
∗
i }, {∡β
∗
i }, and S
∗
mentation, each relay is only able to generate its AN locally, i.e., xr2 = [
√
σ1s
′
1, . . . ,
√
σNs
′
N ]
T ,
in which si’s are i.i.d. AN beams, denoted by s
′
i ∼ CN (0, 1). This type of CJ is known
to be uncoordinated with the covariance matrix given by S = diag([σ1, . . . , σN ]). In this
section, we assume that each relay consumes all of its remaining power from AF for AN,
i.e., σi = ηρiαiPs|hsri|2, ∀i ∈ N (c.f. (5)). Hence, the AN design solely depends on αi’s and/or
ρi’s.
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A. Distributed Algorithm for SPS
First, we propose a heuristic scheme for the ith AF relay to decide on ρi, ∀i, which is given
by
ρi = δ

1− |hrid|2
max
k∈K
|hrie,k|2


+
, (41)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant controlling the relay’s level of jamming. For example, a larger
δ indicates that each relay prefers to splitting a larger portion of power for jamming and vice
versa. The intuition behind (41) is that if the ith relay observes that |hrid|2 ≥ max
kK
|hrie,k|2, which
means that a nonnegative secrecy rate is achievable even if there is only itself in the system, it
will shut down the AN; otherwise, it will split up to δ portion of ρi for jamming. In an extreme
case of |hrid|2 ≪ max
kK
|hrie,k|2, probably when an Eve is located within the very proximity of
this relay, it allocates the maximum permissible portion of power, i.e., δ, for AN.
Next, since an individual relay cannot evaluate the secrecy performance of the whole sys-
tem, ∡βi’s are simply chosen to be the optimum for the multi-AF relaying without security
considerations, i.e., ∡βi = −∡hrid − ∡hsri , ∀i.
B. Distributed Algorithm for DPS
Following the same designs for ρi’s and ∡βi’s in Section V-A, the remaining task for WEH-
enabled relays operating with DPS is to set proper values for αi’s. We choose αi’s that maximize
the “hypothetical SINR”. This “hypothetical” SINR may not be the actual SINR for the destina-
tion, but just a criterion calculated based on the “hypothetical” received signal seen by the ith
relay, given by
y˜di = hridβi
√
1− αi
√
Pshsris+ hridβi
√
1− αina,i + hridβinc,i + hrid
√
σis
′
i + nd, ∀i. (42)
The corresponding SINR is thus expressed as
SINRy˜di =
η(1− ρi)Ps|hsri|2
ησ2na +
ησ2nc
1−αi
+
γi(Ps|hsri |
2+σ2na )
αi
+
γiσ2nc
αi(1−αi)
+ ηρiPs|hsri|2
, (43)
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where γi =
σ2nd
Ps|hsri |
2|hrid|
2 . Consequently, the maximization of (43) w.r.t. αi, ∀i, is formulated as
(P2-distr.) :

min
αi
ησ2nc
1− αi +
γi(Ps|hsri|2 + σ2na)
αi
+
γiσ
2
nc
αi(1− αi)
s.t. 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1.
Proposition 5.1: The optimal αi, ∀i, to (P2-distr.) is
α∗i =
1
1 +
√
(η+γi)σ2nc
γi(Ps|hsri |
2+σ2na+σ
2
nc
)
. (44)
Proof: It is easy to verify that problem (P2-distr.) is convex and the minimum solution of
its objective function derived from the first-order derivative happens to fall within the feasible
region of αi, which is seen in (44).
With ρi’s, ∡βi’s and αi’s set, each AF relay is then able to decide its relay weight and AN
transmission.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we compare our proposed schemes operating with SPS or DPS with some
benchmarks. In the centralized case, the optimal solution for SPS in Section IV-A is denoted by
CJ-SPS, while Algorithm I in Section IV-B is denoted by CJ-DPS. The distributed schemes in
Section V-A and Section V-B are referred to as Distributed-SPS and Distributed-DPS, respec-
tively. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our AN-aided secure multi-AF relay beamforming
algorithms, we also provide three benchmark schemes: NoCJ-SPS, NoCJ-DPS and Random PS.
For NoCJ-SPS, we solve problem (P1) by replacing S with 0. Similarly, for NoCJ-DPS, we
initialize S = 0 and quit the loop in Algorithm I after the very first time of solving problem
(P2′). Random PS, on the other hand, picks up i.i.d. αi and ρi uniformly generated over [0, 1],
respectively, and co-phases ∡βi = −∡hsri − ∡hrid, ∀i.
Consider that N WEH-enabled AF relays and K eavesdroppers (only existing outside from
the “security zone”) are uniformly located within a circular area of radius R. We also assume
that the channel models consist of both large-scale path loss and small-scale multi-path fading.
The unified path loss model is given by
L = A0
(
d
d0
)−κ
, (45)
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where A0 = 10
−3, d denotes the relevant distance, d0 = 1m is a reference distance, and κ is
the path loss exponent set to be 2.5. hsri , hrid, and hrie,k, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K, are generated from
independent Rayleigh fading with zero mean and variance specified by (45).
The simulation parameters are set as follows unless otherwise specified: the radius defining the
range is R = 5m; the transmit power at the source is Ps = 40dBm; the noise variances are set as
σ2na = −80dBm, σ2nc = −50dBm, σ2nd = σ2na +σ2nc , and σ2ne,k = σ2nd , ∀k; the EH efficiency is set
to be η = 50%. Also, numerical results are averaged over 500 independent channel realizations.
A. Secrecy Performance by Centralized Approach
Here, we evaluate the performance of the proposed centralized designs in Section IV. The
efficiency of the alternating optimization that iteratively attains numerical solution to (P2) is
studied in Fig. 3, which shows the increment of the achievable secrecy rate after each round of
the iteration. The most rapid increase is observed after the first iteration, which illustrates that the
optimization of the PS ratios, αi’s, accounts for the main factor for the secrecy rate performance
gains over a SPS scheme that sets {αi = 0.5}. It is seen that the alternating algorithm converges
within the relative tolerance set to be 10−3, after an average of 5–6 iterations for several channel
realizations, which appears reasonable in terms of complexity.
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Fig. 3. The secrecy rate by CJ-DPS versus the number of iterations for the alternating optimization in Table I with Ps = 40dBm,
N = 10, and K = 5.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of different schemes with Ps = 10dB for K = 5.
Fig. 4 shows the achievable secrecy rate for the legitimate Rx with the increase in the number
of AF relays by different schemes. As we can see, the secure multi-AF relaying schemes assisted
by the transmission of AN outperforms that without AN for both SPS and DPS. In addition, with
the increase in N , the role of CJ gradually reduces for both schemes of SPS and DPS. This is
because as N gets larger, the optimal designs tend to suppress the interception at the most capable
eavesdropper more effectively with N DoF, enforcing the numerator of maxk∈K SINRS,E,k to a
relatively low level, which can also be observed from maxk∈K rS,E,k in Fig. 4(a), and therefore
the optimal amount of power allocated to AN beams inclines to be little; otherwise the jamming
yielded will be detrimental to the reception at the legitimate Rx.
Fig. 5 shows the achievable secrecy rate for the legitimate Rx versus the number of eavesdrop-
pers by different schemes. First, similar to the results shown in Fig. 4, the proposed AN-aided
multi-AF relaying designs operating with DPS-enabled relays, viz CJ-DPS, perform best among
all the schemes. Secondly, as K goes up, the AN-aided schemes, CJ-DPS and CJ-SPS, allow the
secrecy rate to drop slowly, in other words, more robust against multiple eavesdroppers, while
the secrecy rate of their NoCJ counterparts almost goes down linearly with K. Furthermore, with
K increasing, for example, more than 10, the increase in the number of relays, from N = 10
to 20, cannot replace the role of CJ as shown in Fig. 4 and 5, since in the presence of many
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Fig. 5. The secrecy rate versus the number of eavesdroppers with Ps = 10dB for N = 10 and N = 20, respectively.
eavesdroppers, more relays may also result in improved eavesdroppers’ decoding ability w/o the
assistance of CJ. It is also noteworthy that with K = 1, there is little use of CJ by the centralized
schemes, which was also observed in [35].
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Fig. 6. The secrecy rate versus the transmit power with K = 5 for N = 10 and N = 20, respectively.
Fig. 6 provides simulation results of different schemes by varying the source transmit power.
It is seen that with more power available at the source, the advantage of CJ is more pronounced,
since given other variables fixed, larger Ps indicates larger feasible regions for (P1) and (P2).
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Furthermore, as similarly seen in Fig. 4, with a mild number of eavesdroppers (K = 5), subject
to the same Ps, a large number of cooperative relays enables more DoF in designing the optimal
αi’s and ∡βi’s, which alleviates the dependence on AN beams to combat Eves.
B. Secrecy Performance by Distributed Algorithms
Here, we study the performance of the distributed schemes, namely, Distributed-SPS and
Distributed-DPS in Section V. As mentioned earlier, these heuristics are provided as benchmarks
to demonstrate what can be done under the extreme “no-coordination” circumstance, in compar-
ison with Random PS. Note that any other distributed schemes with certain level of cooperation
among relays are supposed to increase the secrecy performance up to the proposed centralized
algorithms, namely, CJ-DPS and CJ-SPS, at the expense of extra computational complexity and
system overhead. δ is set to be 0.5.
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Fig. 7. The secrecy rate versus the number of AF relays by distributed algorithms with Ps = 10dB.
Fig. 7 provides the results for the achievable secrecy rate of various schemes versus the
number of relays. Distributed-SPS and Distributed-DPS, are observed to be outperformed by
their centralized counterparts though, they are considerably superior to Random PS. It is also
seen that the performance gap between the centralized and distributed approaches is enlarged
as N increases, which is expected, since larger N yields more DoF for cooperation that is
exclusively beneficial for the centralized schemes. Furthermore, compared with the centralized
schemes, the distributed ones are more vulnerable to the increase in the eavesdroppers’ number.
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In Fig. 8, we investigate the relationship between the secrecy rate performance and the number
of eavesdroppers by different methods. As can be observed, compared with the centralized
schemes, the secrecy rates achieved by Distributed-SPS and Distributed-DPS both reduce more
drastically with the increase in K due to the lack of effective cooperation. Also, the advantage
of DPS over SPS for the distributed schemes is compromised since αi’s are not jointly designed
with other parameters. At last, a similar observation has been made as that for Fig. 7, that is,
larger N yields more visible performance gap between the centralized and distributed approaches.
Transmit power(P
s
) (dB)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Se
cr
ec
y 
ra
te
 fo
r t
he
 R
x 
(bp
s/H
z)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
CJ-DPS (centralized)
Distributed-SPS
Distributed-DPS
Random PS
N=20
N=10
Fig. 9. The secrecy rate versus transmit power by distributed algorithms with K = 5.
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In Fig. 9, we examine the effect of increasing the transmit power at the source on the secrecy
performance of different schemes under the same settings as those in Fig. 6. Among all the
presented designs, CJ-DPS still achieves the best secrecy rate as observed in other examples.
Also, the fact that larger N benefits more from cooperative designs is corroborated again due
to the same reason as that for Fig. 7 and 8. Furthermore, the secrecy rate of Distributed-
SPS or Distributed-DPS is quickly saturated when Ps > 20dB while that for their centralized
counterparts still rises at fast speed.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studied secure communications using multiple single-antenna WEH-enabled AF
relays assisted by AN via CJ for a SWIPT network with multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers.
Using PS at the relays, the achievable secrecy rates for the relay wiretap channel were maxi-
mized by jointly optimizing the CB and the CJ covariance matrix along with the PS ratios for
relays operating with, respectively, SPS and DPS. For DPS, Reformulating the constraints into
restricted hyperbolic forms enabled us to develop convex optimization-based solutions. Further,
we proposed an information-exchange-free distributed algorithm that outperforms the random
decision.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 4.1
The Lagrangian of problem (P1.1-SDP) is given by
L(χ) =trace
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where χ denotes a tuple consisting of all the primal and dual variables. Specifically, Y 1, Y 2
and λ are Lagrangian multipliers associated with Xˆ1, Sˆ and the first constraint of (P1.1-SDP),
respectively; {θk} are the dual variables associated with the SINR constraint for the kth Eve,
respectively; U = diag([ui]
N
i=1) with each diagonal entry ui denoting the dual variable associated
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with the per-relay power constraint; ζ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with ξ ≥ 0. In
addition, W 0 = diag([ηα¯iPs|hsri|2]Ni=1). The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for (46)
are listed as follows:
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Pre- and post-multiplyingW
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0 with the left hand side (LHS) and right hand side (RHS) of (47b),
respectively, and substituting W
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Introducing the notation of [·]offd to represent a square matrix with its diagonal entries removed,
it follows from (47b) that
 W 120Y 2W 120 − λW 120h†rdhTrdW 120
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By subtracting (49) from (48), Y 1 can be rewritten as
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where [·]d denotes a square matrix with only the diagonal remained. Observing that
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As a result, Y ∗1 can be finally recast as
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In the following, we show that Ξ +
∑K
k=1 θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k is a positive definite matrix. Note
that since Ξ is a diagonal matrix, its definiteness is only determined by the signs of its diagonal
entries, for which we commence with the discussion in three difference cases below.
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3) Case III: ∃i such that λ − ∑Kk=1 θk ( 1τ − 1) [Red,k]i,i = 0. In this case, it follows that
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≥ 0. It is noteworthy that the number of i’s such that λ −∑K
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k=1 θk[Red,k]i2,i2 , which contradicts to the fact that for any two independent
continuously distributed random variables, the chance that they are equal is zero.
In summary, [Ξ]i,i ≥ 0, ∀i. If [Ξ]i,i > 0, then it is obvious that Ξ+
∑K
k=1 θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k ≻ 0.
Next, we show that it still holds true in the case that ∃i′, such that [Ξ]i′,i′ = 0, i′ ∈ N ,
by definition. Define the null-space of Ξ by ψ = {η|η = αei′ , α ∈ C} and multiply ηH
and η, ∀η 6= 0, on the LHS and RHS of Ξ +∑Kk=1 θkPsh˜†se,kh˜Tse,k, respectively. If η /∈ ψ,
it is straightforward to obtain ηH(Ξ +
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28
ηH(Ξ +
∑K
k=1 θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k)η =
∑K
k=1 θkPsα
2|[h˜se,k]i′ |2 > 0, as [h˜se,k]i′ 6= 0 in probability.
This completes the proof.
Finally, multiplying both sides of (52) by Xˆ
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Therefore, (55) admits a unique solution wˆ1 up to a scaling factor, which is given by
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Consequently, we have wˆ∗1 = βwˆ1, where β ∈ R+. On the other hand, by plugging wˆ∗1 = βwˆ1
into the equality constraint of (P1.1-SDP), we have β =
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At last, we show 3) of Proposition 4.1. For the case of K ≥ N , it is obvious that rank(Sˆ)∗ ≤
N . For the case ofK < N , only a sketch of the proof is provided here due to the length constraint.
According to (47b), first it is provable that λh†rdh
T
rd+U is a full-rank matrix when (P1.1-SDP)
obtains its optimum value; next, observing that rank(Y 2) ≥ N − rank(
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†
re,kh
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follows that rank(Y 2) ≥ N − K as a result of rank(
∑K
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†
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T
re,k) ≤ K; then according
to (47e), rank(Sˆ
∗
) ≤ K is thus obtained.
REFERENCES
[1] X. Lu, P. Wang, D. Niyato, D. I. Kim, and Z. Han, “Wireless networks with RF energy harvesting: a contemporary survey,”
IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 757–789, Second Quart. 2015.
[2] S. Bi, C. K. Ho, and R. Zhang, “Wireless powered communication: opportunities and challenges,” IEEE Commun. Mag.,
vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 117–125, Apr. 2015.
29
[3] P. Grover and A. Sahai, “Shannon meets Tesla: wireless information and power transfer,” in Proc. IEEE International
Symposium on Information (ISIT), Austin, TX, USA, Jun. 2010, pp. 2363–2367.
[4] R. Zhang and C. K. Ho, “MIMO broadcasting for simultaneous wireless information and power transfer,” IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 1989–2001, May 2013.
[5] L. Lai and H. El Gamal, “The relay-eavesdropper channel: cooperation for secrecy,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no.
9, pp. 4005–4019, Sep. 2008.
[6] E. Tekin, S. Member, and A. Yener, “The general Gaussian multiple-access and two-way wiretap channels : achievable rates
and cooperative jamming,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2735–2751, Jun. 2008.
[7] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. Petropulu, and H. Poor, “Improving wireless physical layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE
Trans. Signal Process., vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875–1888, Mar. 2010.
[8] J. Zhang and M. C. Gursoy, “Relay beamforming strategies for physical-layer security,” in Proc. IEEE Annual Conference
on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS’10), Princeton, USA, Mar. 2010, pp.1–6.
[9] Y. Yang, Q. Li, W.-K. Ma, J. Ge, and P. C. Ching, “Cooperative secure beamforming for AF relay networks with multiple
eavesdroppers,” IEEE Signal Process. Lett., vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 35–38, Jan. 2013.
[10] J. Li, A. P. Petropulu, and S. Weber, “On cooperative relaying schemes for wireless physical layer security,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 59, no. 10, pp. 4985–4997, Oct. 2011.
[11] C. Jeong and I.-M. Kim, “Optimal power allocation for secure multicarrier relay systems,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process.,
vol. 59, no. 11, pp. 5428–5442, Nov. 2011.
[12] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 6, pp.
2180–2189, Jun. 2008.
[13] G. Zheng, L.-C. Choo, and K.-K. Wong, “Optimal cooperative jamming to enhance physical layer security using relays,”
IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 1317–1322, Mar. 2011.
[14] J. Huang and A. L. Swindlehurst, “Cooperative jamming for secure communications in MIMO relay networks,” IEEE
Trans. Signal Process., vol. 59, no. 10, pp. 4871–4884, Oct. 2011.
[15] S. Luo, J. Li, and A. Petropulu, “Uncoordinated cooperative jamming for secret communications,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics
Security, vol. 8, no. 7, pp. 1081–1090, Jul. 2013.
[16] H. Xing, K.-K. Wong, Z. Chu, and A. Nallanathan, “To harvest and jam: a paradigm of self-sustaining friendly jammers
for secure AF relaying,” to appear in IEEE Trans. Signal Process., available on-line at arXiv:1502.07066v3.
[17] I. Krikidis, J. Thompson, and S. Mclaughlin, “Relay selection for secure cooperative networks with jamming,” IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., vol. 8, no. 10, pp. 5003–5011, Oct. 2009.
[18] Z. Ding, K. K. Leung, D. L. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, “Opportunistic relaying for secrecy communications: cooperative
jamming vs. relay chatting,” IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun., vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 1725–1729, Jun. 2011.
[19] Y. Yang, Q. Li, W.-K. Ma, J. Ge, and M. Lin, “Optimal joint cooperative beamforming and artificial noise design for
secrecy rate maximization in AF relay networks,” in Proc. IEEE Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless
Communications (SPAWC), Darmstadt, DE, Jun. 2013, pp.360–364.
[20] Q. Li, Y. Yang, W.-K. Ma, M. Lin, J. Ge, and J. Lin, “Robust cooperative beamforming and artificial noise design for
physical-layer secrecy in AF multi-antenna multi-relay networks,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 206–220,
Jan. 2015.
[21] X. Zhou, R. Zhang, and C. K. Ho, “Wireless information and power transfer: architecture design and rate-energy tradeoff,”
IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61, no. 11, pp. 4754–4767, Nov. 2013.
30
[22] A. Nasir, X. Zhou, S. Durrani, and R. Kennedy, “Relaying protocols for wireless energy harvesting and information
processing,” IEEE Trans.Wireless Commun., vol. 12, no. 7, pp. 3622–3636, Jul. 2013.
[23] Z. Ding, S. Perlaza, I. Esnaola, and H. Poor, “Power allocation strategies in energy harvesting wireless cooperative
networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 846–860, Feb. 2014.
[24] S. Timotheou, I. Krikidis, G. Zheng, and B. Ottersten, “Beamforming for MISO interference channels with QoS and RF
energy transfer,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol.13, no.5, pp. 2646–2658, May 2014.
[25] M. Zhao, X. Wang, and S. Feng, “Joint power splitting and secure beamforming design in the multiple non-regenerative
wireless-powered relay networks,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 19, no. 9, pp. 1540–1543, Sept. 2015.
[26] L. Liu, R. Zhang, and K.-C. Chua, “Secrecy wireless information and power transfer with MISO beamforming,” IEEE
Trans. Signal Process., vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 1850-1863, April 2014.
[27] D. Ng, E. Lo, and R. Schober, “Robust beamforming for secure communication in systems with wireless information and
power transfer,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 8, pp. 4599–4615, Aug. 2014.
[28] H. Xing, L.Liu, and R. Zhang, “Secrecy wireless information and power transfer in fading wiretap channel,” to appear in
IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 180–190, Jan. 2016.
[29] Q. Li, Q. Zhang, and J. Qin, “Secure relay beamforming for simultaneous wireless information and power transfer in
non-regenerative relay networks,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 63, no. 5, pp. 2462–2467, Jun. 2014.
[30] Y. Liang, G. Kramer, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai (Shitz), “Compound wiretap channels,” EURASIP J. Wirel. Commun.
Netw., vol. 2009, pp. 1–12, Mar. 2009.
[31] H. Xing, K.-K. Wong, A. Nallanathan, and R. Zhang, “Wireless powered cooperative jamming for secrecy multi-AF
relaying networks,” [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1511.03705.
[32] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge,U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.
[33] A. Charnes and W. W. Cooper, “Programming with linear fractional functionals,” Naval Res. Logist. Quart., vol. 9, no.
3-4, pp. 181–186, Sept.-Dec. 1962.
[34] M. Grant and S. Boyd. (2015, Jun.) CVX: Matlab software for disciplined convex programming, version 2.1. [Online].
Available: http://cvxr.com/cvx/
[35] Q. Li and W.-K. Ma, “Spatially selective artificial-noise aided transmit optimization for MISO multi-Eves secrecy rate
maximization,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 61, no. 10, pp. 2704–2717, May 2013.
[36] Z. Chu, H. Xing, M. Johnston, and S. Le Goff, “Secrecy rate optimizations for a MISO secrecy channel with multiple
multi-antenna eavesdroppers,” to appear in IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., 2015.
[37] Y. C. Eldar, A. Ben-Tal, and A. Nemirovski, “Robust mean-squared error estimation in the presence of model uncertainties,”
IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 168–181, Jan. 2005.
[38] A. Hasan and J. G. Andrews, “The guard zone in wireless ad-hoc networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 6, no.
3, pp. 897–906, Mar. 2007.
[39] A. Mukherjee and A. L. Swindlehurst, “Detecting passive eavesdroppers in the MIMO wiretap channel,” Proc. IEEE
International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), Kyoto, Japan, Mar. 2012, pp. 2809–2812.
[40] A. Alabbasi, Z. Rezki, and B. Shihada, “Energy efficient resource allocation for cognitive radios: a generalized sensing
analysis,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 2455–2469, May 2015.
